JUDGES ACTING AS TRESPASSERS OF THE LAW

“It is well known that ‘no one may be required at peril of life, liberty or property to speculate as to the meaning of penal statutes.’” United States v. Ward, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15897 (E.D. Pa Sept. 5, 2001). *12 (quoting Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451 (1939)). The Ward court then detailed the rigorous threshold test necessary for criminalizing conduct in the regulatory arena:

Especially where a regulation subjects a private party to criminal sanctions, ‘a regulation cannot be construed to mean what an agency intended but did not adequately express.’ Diamond Roofing Co., Inc. v OSHRC, 528 F.2d 645, 649 (5th Cir 1976). As Bethlehem Steel made clear, ‘if the language is faulty, the Secretary has the means and obligation to amend.’ [Ward, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15897, *19 – *19 (quoting Bethlehem Steel v. Occupational Safety and Health Review Comm’n, 573 F.2d 157, 161 (3rd Cir. 1978)).]

The Ward Court cited a legion of precedents requiring dismissal of the indictment, which likewise require dismissal of the indictment in the vendor fraud case against Plaintiffs. “[I]t is our view that courts should not defer to an agency’s informal interpretation of an ambiguous statute or regulation in a criminal case.” Ward, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15897, *22. See United States v. McGoff, 831 F.2d 1071, 1077 (D.C. Cir. 1987),

In the criminal context, courts have traditionally required greater clarity in draftsmanship than in civil contexts, commensurate with the bedrock principle that in a free country citizens who are potentially subject to criminal sanctions should have clear notice of the behavior that may cause sanctions to be visited upon them.[;]

See also United States v. Apex Oil Co., Inc., 132 F.3d 1287 (9th Cir. 1997) (affirming dismissal of indictment because the conduct was not clearly forbidden by the regulations); United States v. Plaza Health Laboratories, Inc., 3 F.3d 643, 649 (2nd Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 512 U.S. 1245 (1994) (in criminal cases, “a court will not be persuaded by cases urging broad interpretation of a regulation in the civil-penalty context”). See also, United States v. Whiteside, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 4610, *18 – *19 (11th Cir. Mar. 22, 2002) (“The government cannot meet its burden in this case because, despite its contention to the contrary, no Medicare regulation, administrative ruling, or judicial decision exists that clearly “proscribes defendants’ conduct.)

The indictments in the vendor fraud case against defendant and all defendants in similar cases fail to cite violation of any binding federal rule. Accordingly, the indictments directly contravene Supreme Court teaching in Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576 (2000), and over 150 decisions that have relied on it. Defendant and similarly situated defendants in other cases administered much-needed services to the poor under the federally funded Medicaid program, in full compliance with all applicable federal laws and formal regulations. It is contrary to Christensen and its progeny to sustain Defendant’s and similarly situated defendants’ indictments for conduct that did not violate any clear and binding rules.

The Medicaid program has been recognized to constitute one of the most complex and intractable regulatory systems in our country. See Herweg v. Ray, 455 U.S. 265 (1982) Burger, J., dissenting) (observing that ‘the Medicaid program is a morass of bureaucratic complexity.”) Medicaid generally provides the lowest level of reimbursement, and requires treatment of the most ill and difficult patients. Physicians who participate in the low-paying Medicaid program should not be imprisoned based on a game of “gotcha”. See United States v. Harris, 942 F.2d at 1132 (“If the obligation . . . is sufficiently in doubt, willfulness is impossible as a matter of law, and the ‘defendant’s actual intent is irrelevant.’”) (citing Garber, 607 F.2d at 98, quoting United States v. Critzer, 498 F.2d 1160, 1162 (4th Cir. 1974)).

Indictment and/or conviction of Medicaid physicians based on regulatory gamesmanship is both unjust to defendants and catastrophic to the needy patients, because it drives small practitioners out of Medicaid. Courts are increasingly dismissing these types of fraud charges against physicians, and dismissal is appropriate in the vendor fraud case against Plaintiffs. See, e.g State v. Vainio, 2001 MT 220, 35 P.3d 948 (Mont. 2001) (reversing a Medicaid conviction because it was based on an improperly promulgated state regulation); Siddiqi v. United States, 98 F.3d 1427, 1429 (2nd Cir. 1996) (reversing Medicare fraud convictions for “claim[s] for services rendered by somebody else”); id. at 1438 (“It takes no great flash of genius to conclude that something is wrong somewhere.”)

The vendor fraud case against Defendant and similarly situated defendants is void for vagueness, similar to the Siddiqu and the Vainio cases as explained in the precedent setting and controlling cases such as Harriss, Gresham, and Brierton. “Void for vagueness” means criminal responsibility should not attach where one could not reasonably understand that his contemplated conduct is proscribed. United States v. Chandler, 66 F. 3d 1460 (8th Cir. 1995) The vendor fraud case against Defendant and similarly situated defendants clearly falls under the void for vagueness doctrine and should have been dismissed ab initio. Therefore, the trial court never had subject matter jurisdiction.

SUBSTITUTE BILLING NOT A CRIME

Alleged vendor fraud crime outside of statutory authority and barred by Supremacy Clause

This is not a matter of an unconstitutional statute. There is no statute or administrative rule in Illinois barring this allegedly criminal act of substitute billing in the case at bar as fraudulently charged. This act is specifically authorized by the federal Medicaid Code, Federal Code of Regulations, State Statutes, and State Administrative Code. Therefore, this case is a matter of enforcing federal code, which is being violated by this fraudulent prosecution, and not a matter of constitutionality of a state statute.

FEDERAL LAW REQUIRES FUNDING OF NON-PHYSICIAN EMPLOYEES OF PHYSICIANS SERVICES TO THE POOR

SUMMARY

In summary, a prosecutor who acts without State or Constitutional authority as a prosecutor, who then generates legally insufficient indictments, using illegally impaneled grand juries, to charge a person with a crime despite the Supremacy clause providing that the act is NOT a crime under federal law, and the fact that the charge is void due to vagueness has failed to state a claim and is not properly before the trial court. The sham prosecutor, her assistants, and their investigators are acting as individuals without legal authority and are all personally liable under § 1983 and state tort law.

All judge who act on such an indictment, despite the fact it was not properly before the court, especially when they ignore extensive motions by the defendant about these issues, are committing acts of treason and are grossly violating their oaths of office as well as the United States and Illinois Constitutions.

Therefore, none of the Defendants in this case are immune from liability as prosecutors or judges.

Respectfully submitted by:

______________________

Linda L. Shelton, Pro Se

[1] People v. Foxall, 283 Ill. App. 3d 724 (1996): The defendant was charged by information with disorderly conduct based on transmitting a false report of sexual misconduct to the Department of Children and Family Services. Foxall, 283 Ill. App. 3d at 727. The reviewing court held that the information was insufficient because it did not specify the contents of the false report, and basic fairness required the State to identify the allegedly false statements. Foxall, 283 Ill. App. 3d at 727.

Davis: The reviewing court found that the indictment was insufficient when the defendant was charged with official misconduct based on “disseminat[ing] information,” but the indictment did not identify the contents of the alleged communication. Davis, 281 Ill. App. 3d at 990.

People v. Stoudt, 198 Ill. App. 3d 124 (1990): The reviewing court held that a complaint that charged defendant with resisting a police officer was insufficient when the complaint stated that the officer was engaged in the execution of his official duties but did not identify the authorized act the officer was performing. Stoudt, 198 Ill. App. 3d at 128.

People v. Leach, 279 N.E.2d 450 (Ill.App.1st, 1972): The defendant in Leach was charged with resisting or obstructing a police officer. The charging instrument was insufficient because it only stated that the defendant committed the above offense by knowingly obstructing a police officer. Id. at 453-454

United States v. Bobo, 344 F.3d 1076 (11th Cir, 2003): The indictment was insufficient because it failed to specify the nature of the scheme used by the defendant to defraud the State of Alabama and the United States.

United States v. Nance, 533 F.2d 699 (D.C. Cir., 1976): The indictment was insufficient because it failed to apprise the defendant of the nature of the false pretenses by which the defendant gained unauthorized control over money.

People v. Gerdes, 527 N.E.2d 1310 (Ill.App.5th, 1988): The defendant in Gerdes was charged with obstructing justice by giving false information to the police. The charging instrument did not specify the nature of the allegedly false information. The defendant was therefore left to wonder which of many statements to the police the basis for the charge against him was, so the appellate court dismissed the indictment. Id.

Download Original Letter

Here is what happens when Judges act as "Trespassers of the Law":

Family court corrupt system drives dad to suicide... through "Abuse of Discretion"?

A Father’s Suicide Note – MAY CHRISTOPHER RIP

Utterly abused by the family court system, Christopher Mackney, 45, committed suicide!

Dec 29, 2013 in Washington DC.

The pain from the emotional abuse, psychological abuse, parental alienation and legal abuse has been unbearable. My children and I were abused and when spoke out and no one did anything. No one. Not the attorneys, doctors or Judges. They all recognized the patterns of behavior and the source of conflict and turned a blind eye and then blocked me from bringing in a third party or Guardian Ad Litem to identify the abuse. At any point throughout this case, if the Court had ruled in my favor on any of my motions, the outcome would have been different. At any point, if my ex-wife had shown ANY kind of act of good faith, the outcome would have been different. The facts are that not one of my motions was ever granted by the Court and my ex-wife never once acted in good faith.

Judge Randy Bellows did not like my explanation for the conflict and chose to ignore the evidence contradictory with its views. He did not want to admit that he had been so easily mislead. There is nothing I could do to end the abuse or change the view of the Court. As long as I was the problem, there was no reason to consider an alternate narrative.

I had no power or control in my marriage and I had even less when the divorce began. It was not an accident that I ended up with no visitation with my own children and no ability to monitor their emotional welfare. It was orchestrated by attorneys who were paid not to settle and insisted on litigating every single issue without discussion. It was all done to increase the stress and pressure. Nothing I said mattered. My rights as a parent did not matter. They had the power, control, money and the kids and they were not negotiating. Even after I gave my ex-wife full custody, just to appease her. She insisted on litigating visitation, asking the Judge for “no visitation” even though there was no abuse. She also asked for all the assets in the marriage. I got absolutely nothing and I had to pay her legal bills.

The decision was made to eliminate me from my children’s lives the day I discovered that my ex-wife had hidden her father’s murder conviction, on June 23, 2008. The very next day, her father hired two attorney’s who advertise that they are ‘not the type to settle, so have your wallet open’. Their job was to “get orders” as Jim Cottrell described it in Court and keep the legal and financial pressure up as high as possible.

Make no mistake, this case was never about money or the children. My ex-wife’s multiple requests that I leave town and give up my children is evidence of that. It was about a pathological need for control and domination. I saw behind the mask and the facade and I needed to be eliminated, just like Sam Degelia needed to be eliminated for discovering Pete Scamardo was trafficking heroin. The plan was to have attorneys negatively interpret anything I say or do and then litigate every issue. I needed to be portrayed as the source of conflict, so the legal and financial pressure could be applied. With no money, I could not afford an attorney to protect me. By denying access to the Children, they would use any reaction from me to distract from the real problem. My reactions to being abused, controlled, bullied and alienated were not the source of conflict. When I spoke out or asked the Court for help, I was ignored and silenced. The patterns of high conflict behavior exist throughout my ex-wife and her family’s past. I only pointed out how the pattern seemed to match the patterns also found in ‘high-conflict’ divorce.

Refusing to negotiate or resolve differences outside of Court and then paying attorneys over $1 Million in legal fees does not lead to peace. But, that was the point. I never wanted to speak out and cause any embarrassment to my children or my ex-wife. I swear I didn’t. I only wanted to be away and free from my ex-wife and be the best father I could be. I made countless offers to settle and asked what they wanted to keep us out of Court. I never received a response to any of my requests or proposals. Actually, I did get one proposal the night before our Division of assets hearing, that was completely in bad faith and unlivable. It was not a ‘good faith’ effort.

They finally told my attorney in 2011, that if I left town and gave up all efforts to see my children, that would end the conflict. I wanted so much to be free of the litigation and the madness that I did just as they requested. I left town and moved to Dallas, TX, thinking I would never see my children again, but at least the nightmare would be over. it broke my heart and my spirit, but at least I didn’t have to worry about going to jail (or so I thought). I got a job and started going to the gym, trying to get healthy again. The first month I was in Dallas working, my ex-wife tracked me down and had Child Support Enforcement come after me. Now that I was in Dallas, I would have no ability to go to Court to change the order. When I appealed to my ex-wife’s attorney, requesting that they voluntarily lower my child support, they refused to respond. I had no leverage, so I said that if they do not voluntarily agree to a reduction, I would have no other choice but to speak out about the abuses. They decided that I was trying to extort money from them, even though I left town, as requested, and took my emails to the Commonwealth’s attorney to have me arrested for attempted extortion.

The Commonwealth’s attorney had me arrested in Dallas and extradited back to Virginia, where I was put on trial for a felony. I begged the Commonwealth’s attorney and my ex-wife to plead guilty to a misdemeanor, as I did not wish to risk a felony conviction. They both refused. This was also confirmation that my ex-wife did not care about the money or the children. So, we went to trial and I was found not guilty. I did not ask for any money from her and the child support I owe is to my children, not my ex-wife. The Jury saw that my attempts to reduce my child support were not an effort to obtain money at all, and the law supported the verdict. It was a clear effort on the Commonwealth’s attorney to silence me for threatening to speak out about the fraud of Dr. Samenow, one of their star witnesses, and the Cover-up by Judge Randy Bellows. Why else wouldn’t they accept a plea to my first criminal charge, ever?

When I was released from Jail again, I asked my ex-wife’s attorney, again to voluntarily reduce my child support or to appoint a Guardian Ad Litem for the children. Even after they put me in jail and had me tried for a felony, they refused to show any good faith. I got no response from my ex-wife’s attorney. My child support was still far beyond my ability to pay and now I was without a job.

It was obvious to me a long time ago, that I would be ‘bullied until eternity’, as I wrote my attorney in 2008. For them to come after me again after leaving town, refuse to let me plead guilty to a lesser charge and to refuse to voluntarily reduce my child support, it was even more obvious that the only objective was to keep the legal, financial, and emotional pressure on me. I was being bullied to death.

I never wanted to speak out about any of this. All I wanted was a fair and reasonable child support, fair and reasonable visitation with my children and be free to move on with my life. The only reason I chose to write this blog and speak out about the abuse was because I thought it would give me some kind of leverage, as I had none. I made it clear to my ex-wife’s attorney that the Court was not allowing me to change the orders, I had no information about my children and my child support was far beyond my ability to pay. I was hoping for some act of good faith to let me know that they wanted to reduce the conflict. It never came, not in 5 years. I felt that my only recourse was to speak out about the abuse and injustice in order to get the legal and psychological help I needed to manage the conflict, so that we could both parent our children. I reached out to my ex-wife’s attorney again to ask for ANY other alternative. They offered none, so I started the blog. Even after I started the Blog, I reached out again to tell them I would take down the blog if a Guardian Ad Litem could be appointed. They never responded. Dina knew this would be the outcome and didn’t care. As long as I was gone.

In hindsight, I recognize that my reactions to being bullied, abused and denied access to my children gave my ex-wife’s attorney the ammunition they were looking for to bring me into Court, but nothing I said or done would have made a difference. I was powerless. I thought that at some point a third party would be involved that would recognize that my reactions were from the emotional abuse; being denied access to my children and bullied in Court. The Court refused at least 6 requests for third party intervention. All of the research said that a third party was the recommended course of action in these situations. A third party was the only way to truly understand the conflict. I was not the person being portrayed in Court. I had no control over anything. The Court would only listen to my ex-wife’s attorney granting all of their motions and agreeing to all their “over-reaching” remedies. When I read online about the patterns of behavior of high conflict divorce and how my ex-wife was the one blocking access to the children and negatively interpreting everything I did, I spoke out and tried to address the source of conflict. No one would tell me I was wrong, but no one would speak out about the abuse on my behalf, not the Doctors or attorneys.

Experts in psychology have called it abuse, but none would make such a ‘diagnosis’, which I could then take to Court to obtain relief. As long as the pattern of behavior was not called ‘abuse’, my reactions would not be viewed in its proper context, by the Court.

The way I looked at it was that if I remained silent, the abuse would continue. It did. When I finally decided to speak out, they didn’t care. They didn’t care about how it would affect Dr. Samenow, Judge Bellows, our children, themselves or anyone else. They were not going to take their foot off the back of my neck. They were fully invested in having me out of my children’s lives, permanently.

Bullying and parental alienation are all forms of emotional abuse. Psychopathy is an emotional dysfunction. People with psychopathy are identified by how they handle conflict. It is the disturbing lack of empathy, guilt shame, remorse that give them away. They are completely unaffected by the distress of others. As long as they get what they want, you may never see that side of them. If you are in a position of power or status, you will probably not see that side of them either. However, people that are close to them or are of little value to them, will eventually see the pattern. They will slowly begin to realize they are being controlled manipulated and ‘gas lighted’.

Without even realizing it, you learn to go along to get along. If you break from this, you will experience their wrath. I remember on Memorial Day 2008, when I went to pick up my children for lunch at their grandparents house, Pete Scamardo came outside to confront me. I looked at him and said “Pete, you are nothing but a bully.” He responded “That’s right, and I love it!’ He said this in front of Dina, he wife and my children. When I got in the car to take my children to lunch, my son asked me “Dad, what’s a bully?”

Pete Scamardo and Dina Mackney are the most ‘successful’ father/daughter psychopaths ever to fool the Court. Pete Scamardo has over 100 lawsuits in Fairfax County alone. The litigants in these cases can confirm the patterns. The enitre Scamardo family was accused of fraud by Maryland National Bank for $80 Million. Pete and Dina also circumvented the Thoroughbred Ownership licensing laws of Virginia, Maryland and West Virginia. One of her friends from college now refers to her the ‘c’ word after seeing the real Dina, after working with her. Most of you will not see that side of her, unless you run into conflict. While I am the one that took my own life, this was a murder conceived and financed by Pete Scamardo who hired Jim Cottrell and Kyle Bartol the day after I discovered he was a murderer, and then paid over $1 Million in legal fees to make it happen. People ‘targeted’ by psychopaths call it ‘murder by suicide’.

I was a good father to my children when I was in their lives. No one can dispute or deny that. Dr. Samenow even admitted under oath that I had a ‘palpable’ relationship with my kids. I know I was an extremely loving and positive influence on their lives and it kills me that I even feel like I have to defend my parenting. My children were the only source of joy and happiness in my marriage. For the Judge Bellows to deny parents and children a ‘palpable relationship’ and each other’s love is corruption. He did not want it to be known that Dr. Samenow committed fraud or that Judge Terrence Ney had a ‘close relationship’ with a convicted murderer or a parental alienator.

The love that my daughter and I shared was truly special. She is a such a sweet, kind and gentle spirit. I am so sorry that I will not be there to see her grow into a beautiful woman. It absolutely crushed me to not be in her life over the last three years. I worked very hard as a father to build her confidence and self-esteem. She is smart, funny and considerate, but she didn’t know it yet. I pray that she realizes her strengths and her confidence in herself will continue to grow. I love you dearly, Lily.

My son Jack was just entering Kindergarten, when I lost access to him. He is gregarious, outgoing and a great athlete. He is smart and fearless. He could have just as much fun by himself as he could with other kids. Even the older boys in our neighbourhood wanted to play with Jack. It absolutely breaks my heart that I will not be able to help him grow into a man. I love you to, Jack. I miss you both so much.

My identity was taken from me, as result of this process. When it began, I was a commercial real estate broker with CB Richard Ellis. I lived by the Golden rule and made a living by bringing parties together and finding the common ground. My reputation as a broker was built on my honesty and integrity. When it ended, I was broke, homeless, unemployed and had no visitation with my own children.

I had no confidence and was paralyzed with fear that I would be going to jail whenever my ex-wife wanted. Nothing I could say or do would stop it. This is what being to death or ‘targeted’ by a psychopath looks like. This is the outcome. I didn’t somehow change into a ‘high-conflict’ person or lose my ability to steer clear of the law. I’ve had never been arrested, depressed, homeless or suicidal before this process. The stress and pressure applied to me was deliberate and nothing I could do or say would get me any relief. Nothing I or my attorneys said to my ex-wife’s attorney or to the Court made any difference. Truth, facts, evidence or even the best interest of my children had no affect on the outcome.

The family court system is broken, but from my experience, it is not the laws, its the lawyers. They feed off of the conflict. They are not hired to reduce conflict or protect the best interest of children, which is why third parties need to be involved. It should be mandatory for children to have a guardian ad litem, with extensive training in abuse and aggression.

It is absolutely shameful that the Fairfax County Court did nothing to intervene or understand the ongoing conflict. Judge Randy Bellows also used the Children as punishment, by withholding access for failing to fax a receipt. The entire conflict centered around the denial of access to the children, it was inconceivable to me that he would use children like this. This is exactly what my ex-wife was doing and now Judge Bellows was doing it for her.

To all my family, friends and the people that supported me through this process, I am so sorry. I know my reactions and behavior throughout this process did not always make sense. None of this made sense to me either. I had no help and the only suggestion I got from my attorneys was to remain silent.

At first, I did what I was told, remained silent and listened to my attorneys. Then after I had given my ex-wife full custody to try and appease her, I learned about Psychopathy and emailed Dr. Samenow about my concerns and asked him for help. Of course, I was ignored. As the conflict continued, I was forced to defend myself. When that didn’t work, I thought I could get the help I needed by speaking out. There is no right or wrong way to defend yourself from abuse. Naively, I thought that abuse was abuse and it would be recognized and something would be done. I thought speaking out would end the abuse or at least get them to back off. It didn’t. When no one did anything they were emboldened.

I took my own life because I had come to the conclusion that there was nothing I could do or say to end the abuse. Every time I got up off my knees, I would get knocked back down. They were not going to let me be the father I wanted to be to my children. People may think I am a coward for giving up on my children, but I didn’t see how I was going to heal from this. I have no money for an attorney, therapy or medication. I have lost four jobs because of this process. I was going to be at their mercy for the rest of my life and they had shown me none.

Being alienated, legally abused, emotionally abused, isolated and financially ruined are all a recipe for suicide. I wish I were stronger to keep going, but the emotional pain and fear of going to court and jail [because of exorbitant child support] became overwhelming. I became paralyzed with fear. I couldn’t flee and I could not fight. I was never going to be allowed to heal or recover. I wish I were better at articulating the psychological and emotional trauma I experienced.

I could fill a book with all the lies and mysterious rulings of the Court. Never have I experienced this kind of pain. I asked for help, but good men did nothing and evil prevailed. All I wanted was a Guardian Ad Litem for my children. Any third party would have been easily been able to confirm or refute all of my allegations, which is why none was ever appointed to protect the children or reduce the conflict.

Abuse is about power and control. Stand up for the abused and speak out. If someone speaks out about abuse, believe them.

Please teach my children empathy and about emotional invalidation and ‘gas-lighting’ or they may end up like me.

God have mercy on my soul.

By Christopher Mackney - Washington DC

PARENTS: If you and your children have been mistreated by corrupt Government Officials, its time to enforce and restore your human rights. The above mentioned facts regarding TRESPASSERS OF THE LAW and our combined legal strategies should have opened your eyes how you and your children can fight back. We only act in your child’s best interest, and make this always our highest priority to restore their human rights, reunite you with your children by enforcing International Laws and Treaties to hold all "bad actors" accountable!

If your rights or the rights of your children have been violated, and you believe your judge committed FRAUD ON THE COURT, please talk to us to enforce your and your children's rights and hold the perpetrators accountable!

Massive federal memorandum of law proving that Attorney General's & Judges lack immunity – liable for malicious prosecution.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION

LINDA SHELTON v. ILLINOIS ATTORNEY GENERAL LISA MADIGAN et al.

Case Number 06 C 4259

before Honorable Judge Joan H. Lefkow

MEMORANDUM OF LAW – JURISDICTION

Defendant, Pro Se, respectfully presents to this Honorable Court the following memorandum of law concerning statutes and case law regarding total and complete lack of prosecutorial and judicial jurisdiction of sham prosecutors and judges in this case.

Judges and prosecutors have absolute immunity unless they totally lack subject-matter or personal jurisdiction in the case. A judge acting without subject-matter jurisdiction is acting without judicial authority. Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat) 264, 404, 5 L.Ed 257 (1821) The U.S. Supreme Court, in Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 94 S.Ct. 1683, 1687 (1974) stated that "when a state officer acts under a state law in a manner violative of the Federal Constitution”, he "comes into conflict with the superior authority of that Constitution, and he is in that case stripped of his official or representative character and is subjected in his person to the consequences of his individual conduct. The State has no power to impart to him any immunity from responsibility to the supreme authority of the United States." [Emphasis supplied in original].

State officials may be sued as individuals in § 1983 actions. Brokaw v. Mercer County, 235 F.3d 1000 (7th Cir. 2000).

Plaintiff alleges that the prosecutors and judges sued in this case totally lacked subject matter jurisdiction and therefore pursued this prosecution and presided over this prosecution without any legal authority as individuals and trespassers of the Constitution of the United States. The sham prosecutors had no constitutional or statutory authority or jurisdiction to bring the Medicaid vendor fraud charge. The court had no subject matter jurisdiction because the indictment was legally insufficient and failed to state a charge, the charges were void as a violation of the Supremacy clause, the charges were void due to vagueness, and therefore there was a total and complete failure to charge a crime.

INDICTMENT LEGALLY INSUFFICIENT SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION OF THE COURT

A Judge may not claim jurisdiction by fiat. All orders or judgments issued by a judge in a court of limited jurisdiction must contain the findings of the court showing that the court has subject-matter jurisdiction, not allegations that the court has jurisdiction. “. . . in a special statutory proceeding an order must contain the jurisdictional findings prescribed by statute.” In re Jennings, 68 Ill.2d 125, 368 N.E.2d 864 (1977) A judge’s allegation that he has subject-matter jurisdiction is only an allegation. Lombard v. Elmore, 134 Ill.App.3d 898, 480 N.E.2d 1329 (1st Dist. 1985), Hill v. Daily, 28 Ill.App.3d 202, 204, 328 N.E.2d 142 (1975). Inspection of the record of the case is the controlling factor. If the record of the case does not support subject-matter jurisdiction, then the judge has acted without subject-matter jurisdiction. “If it could not legally hear the matter upon the jurisdictional paper presented, its finding that it had the power can add nothing to its authority, – it had no authority to make that finding.” The People v. Brewer, 328 Ill. 472, 483 (1928) Without the specific finding of jurisdiction by the court in an order or judgment, the order or judgment does not comply with the law and is void. The finding can not be merely an unsupported allegation.

The law is well-settled that a void order or judgment is void even before reversal. “Courts are constituted by authority and they cannot go beyond that power delegated to them. If they act beyond that authority, and certainly in contravention of it, their judgments and orders are regarded as nullities. They are not voidable, but simply void, and this even prior to reversal.” Vallely v. Northern Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 254 U.S. 348, 41 S.Ct. 116 (1920)

A court has no jurisdiction where the public policy of the State of Illinois is violated [a crime must be alleged and state ALL the elements of the offense for the complaint to be valid], People v. Meyers, 158 Ill.2d 46, 51 (1994); Martin-Tregona v. Roderick, 29 Ill.App.3d 553, 331 N.E.2d 100 (1st Dist. 1975).

Courts may not attempt to resolve controversies which are not properly presented to them for, if they should do so, it would violate not only the precepts of Constitutional due process, but would fly in the face of the American tradition of adversary litigation. In Re Custody of Ayala, 344 Ill.3d 574, 800 N.E.2d 524, 534-35 (1st Dis. 2003); Ligon v. Williams, 264 Ill.App.3d 701, 637 N.E.2d 633, 639 (1st Dis. 1994); In re Estate of Rice, 77 Ill.App.3d 641, 656-57, 396 N.E.2d 298, 310 (1979)

The Constitutional source of a circuit court’s jurisdiction does not carry with it a license to act in ways inconsistent with controlling statutory law. In re D.W. (People v. Lisa M.), 214 Ill.2d 289, 827 N.E.2d 466, 480 (Ill. 2005); In re Lawrence M., 172 Ill. 2d 523, 529, 670 N.E.2d 710, (Ill. 1996), citing In re M.M., 156 Ill. 2d 53, 75, 619 N.E.2d 702, (Ill. 1993) (Miller, C.J., concurring, joined by Bilandic, J.)

A void judgment, order, or decree is one in which the rendering court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction, lacked personnel jurisdiction, lacked the inherent power or authority to make or enter or enforce the particular order involved. In re D.W. (People v. Lisa M.), 214 Ill.2d 289, 827 N.E.2d 466, 480 (Ill. 2005); People v. Thompson, 209 Ill.2d 19, 23, 805 N.E.2d 1200, 1203 (Ill. 2004); Sarkissian v. Chicago Board of Education, 201 Ill.2d 95, 103, 776 N.E.2d 195, (Ill. 2002), quoting Barnard v. Michael, 392 Ill. 130, 135, 63 N.E.2d 858 (1945). A judge should not proceed in any action in which the judge does not have subject-matter jurisdiction, since she has no lawful authority to act. Any acts made without jurisdiction are void.

FRAUD UPON THE COURT BY PROSECUTOR OR COMPLAINANT INVALIDATES ALL ORDERS OF COURT

Fraud upon the court in obtaining a complaint, information, or indictment invalidates all orders of the court and causes the case to be null and void ab initio. “Fraud upon the court” has been defined by the 7th Circuit Court of Appeals to “embrace that species of fraud which does, or attempts to, defile the court itself, or is a fraud perpetrated by officers of the court so that the judicial machinery can not perform in the usual manner its impartial task of adjudging cases that are presented for adjudication.” Kenner v. C.I.R., 387 F.3d 689 (1968); 7 Moore’s Federal Practice, 2d ed., p. 512, ¶ 60.23. The 7th Circuit further stated “a decision produced by fraud upon the court is not in essence a decision at all, and never becomes final.”

It is also clear and well-settled Illinois law that any attempt to commit “fraud upon the court” vitiates the entire proceeding. People v. Sterling, 357 Ill. 354; 192 N.E. 229 (1934) (“The maxim that fraud vitiates every transaction into which it enters applies to judgments as well as to contracts and other transactions.”); Moore v. Sievers, 336 Ill. 316; 168 N.E. 259 (1929) (“The maxim that fraud vitiates every transaction into which it enters …”); In re Village of Willowbrook, 37 Ill.App.2d 393 (1962) (“It is axiomatic that fraud vitiates everything.”); Dunham v. Dunham, 57 Ill.App. 475 (1894), affirmed 162 Ill. 589 (1896); Skelly Oil Co. v. Universal Oil Products Co., 338 Ill.App. 79, 86 N.E.2d 875, 883-4 (1949); Stasel v. The American Home Security Corporation, 362 Ill. 350; 199 N.E. 798 (1935).

Under Illinois and Federal law, when any officer of the court has committed “fraud upon the court”, the orders and judgment resulting from such fraud on that court are void, of no legal force or effect.

In this case the fraud consisted of the Illinois Attorney General fraudulently claiming to have the authority to prosecute vendor fraud without the at least minimal participation and knowledge of the States Attorney of Cook County, the State fraudulently presenting the law to the court and ignoring the Supremacy clause as well as the State Codes and Rules, the State fraudulently claiming Defendant had committed a crime, the State fraudulently claiming that the indictment was legally sufficient, the State fraudulently claiming that the statute of limitations had not run out, the State fraudulently agreeing with the court that Federal Medicaid Code was not applicable in this case of Medicaid vendor fraud,

JUDICIAL TRESPASSERS OF THE LAW

The Illinois Supreme Court has held that "if the magistrate has not such jurisdiction, then he and those who advise and act with him, or execute his process, are trespassers." Von Kettler et.al. v. Johnson, 57 Ill. 109 (1870)

Under Federal law which is applicable to all states, the U.S. Supreme Court stated that if a court is "without authority, its judgments and orders are regarded as nullities. They are not voidable, but simply void; and form no bar to a recovery sought, even prior to a reversal in opposition to them. They constitute no justification; and all persons concerned in executing such judgments or sentences, are considered, in law, as trespassers." Elliot v. Piersol, 1 Pet. 328, 340, 26 U.S. 328, 340 (1828)

The Illinois Supreme Court held that if a court "could not hear the matter upon the jurisdictional paper presented, its finding that it had the power can add nothing to its authority, - it had no authority to make that finding." The People v. Brewer, 128 Ill. 472, 483 (1928). The judges listed below had no legal authority (jurisdiction) to hear or rule on certain matters before them. They acted without any jurisdiction.

When judges act when they do not have jurisdiction to act, or they enforce a void order (an order issued by a judge without jurisdiction), they become trespassers of the law,and are engaged in treason (see below).

The Court in Yates v. Village of Hoffman Estates, Illinois, 209 F.Supp. 757 (N.D. Ill. 1962) held that "not every action by a judge is in exercise of his judicial function. ... it is not a judicial function for a judge to commit an intentional tort even though the tort occurs in the courthouse."

When a judge acts as a trespasser of the law, when a judge does not follow the law, the judge loses subject-matter jurisdiction and the judge’s orders are void, of no legal force or effect.

By law, a judge is a state officer. The judge then acts not as a judge, but as a private individual (in his person).

VIOLATION OF JUDGE’S OATH OF OFFICE

In Illinois, 705 ILCS 205/4 states "Every person admitted to practice as an attorney and counselor at law shall, before his name is entered upon the roll to be kept as hereinafter provided, take and subscribe an oath, substantially in the following form:

'I do solemnly swear (or affirm, as the case may be), that I will support the constitution of the United States and the constitution of the state of Illinois, and that I will faithfully discharge the duties of the office of attorney and counselor at law to the best of my ability.'"

In Illinois, a judge must take a second oath of office. Under 705 ILCS 35/2 states, in part, that "The several judges of the circuit courts of this State, before entering upon the duties of their office, shall take and subscribe the following oath or affirmation, which shall be filed in the office of the Secretary of State:

'I do solemnly swear (or affirm, as the case may be) that I will support the constitution of the United States, and the constitution of the State of Illinois, and that I will faithfully discharge the duties of judge of ______ court, according to the best of my ability.'"

Further, if the judge had enlisted in the U.S. military, then he has taken a third oath. Under Title 10 U.S.C. Section 502 the judge had subscribed to a lifetime oath, in pertinent part, as follows: "I, __________, do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support and defend the Constitution of the United States against all enemies, foreign or domestic; that I will bear true faith and allegiance to the same; ...".

The U.S. Supreme Court has stated that "No state legislator or executive or judicial officer can war against the Constitution without violating his undertaking to support it.". Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 78 S.Ct. 1401 (1958).

Any judge who does not comply with his oath to the Constitution of the United States wars against that Constitution and engages in acts in violation of the Supreme Law of the Land. The judge is engaged in acts of treason.

Having taken at least two, if not three, oaths of office to support the Constitution of the United States, and the Constitution of the State of Illinois, any judge who has acted in violation of the Constitution is engaged in an act or acts of treason (see below).

If a judge does not fully comply with the Constitution, then his orders are void, In re Sawyer, 124 U.S. 200 (1888), he/she is without jurisdiction, and he/she has engaged in an act or acts of treason.

TREASON BY A JUDGE

Whenever a judge acts where he/she does not have jurisdiction to act, the judge is engaged in an act or acts of treason. U.S. v. Will, 449 U.S. 200, 216, 101 S.Ct. 471, 66 L.Ed.2d 392, 406 (1980); Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat) 264, 404, 5 L.Ed 257 (1821)

The Supreme Court has also held that if a judge wars against the Constitution, or if he acts without jurisdiction, he has engaged in treason to the Constitution. If a judge acts after he has been automatically disqualified by law, then he is acting without jurisdiction, and that suggest that he is then engaging in criminal acts of treason, and may be engaged in extortion and the interference with interstate commerce.

Courts have repeatedly ruled that judges have no immunity for their criminal acts. Since both treason and the interference with interstate commerce are criminal acts, no judge has immunity to engage in such acts.

ATTORNEY GENERAL WITHOUT ANY JURISDICTION TO INDEPENDENTLY PROSECUTE VENDOR FRAUD

Statutes and case law regarding constitutional and statutory authority of Illinois Attorney General do not allow the Illinois Attorney General to prosecute Medicaid Vendor Fraud without the invitation, consent, or participation of the Cook County State’s Attorney.

The Illinois Constitution, Article V, Section 15 states: “The Attorney General shall be the legal officer of the State, and shall have the duties and powers that may be prescribed by law.”

15 ILCS 205/4 (from Ch. 14, par. 4) states:

“The duties of the Attorney General shall be:
…

Fourth – To consult with and advise the several State’s Attorneys in matters relating to the duties of their office; and when, in his judgment, the interest of the people of the State requires it, he shall attend the trial of any party accused of crime, and assist in the prosecution…

Fifth – To investigate alleged violations of the statutes which the Attorney General has a duty to enforce and to conduct other investigations in connection with assisting in the prosecution of a criminal offense at the request of a State’s Attorney…”

People v. Massarella, 53 Ill. App. 3d 774 (1977)” states:

“Although a court may request that the Attorney General act in place of the State’s Attorney if he is sick, absent, uninterested, or unable to attend, Ill. Rev. Stat. Ch. 14, para. 6 (1973), in the absence of such circumstances, even the court may not substitute one official for the other. Moreover, since the State’s Attorney has the duty to take charge and prosecute all criminal offenses in his county, the attorney general has no power to interfere while that duty is being honestly, intelligently, and carefully discharged.

Nowhere in the Illinois Statutes does it state that an Attorney General may initiate and pursue a prosecution, independent of the State’s attorney, in a category of crimes not specifically assigned to the Attorney General by Statute, but which falls under the duties of the State’s attorney according to the following Statute:

55 ILCS 5/3-9005(a) states:

“The duty of each State’s attorney shall be: (1) To commence and prosecute all actions, suits, indictments and prosecutions, civil and criminal, in the circuit court for his county…”

The Illinois Supreme Court in People v. Massarella, 72 Ill.2d 531, 382 N.E.2d 262 (1978), held that the Illinois Attorney General has authority to prosecute any crime with acquiescence of and absent of objection by State’s Attorney. The key is that the state’s attorney had knowledge of the case and actively acquiesced or failed to make an objection. It also held that the Illinois Attorney General has authority to appear before the grand jury without prior approval of the State’s Attorney.

In People v. Buffalo Confectionery Co., 78 Ill.2d 447, 36 Ill.Dec. 705, 401 N.E.2d 546 (1980) the Illinois Supreme Court, under common law, found that “duties of the Attorney General…include the initiation and prosecution of litigation on behalf of the people.” They state that this power “may be exercised concurrently with the power of the State’s Attorney to initiate and prosecute all actions, suits, indictments, and prosecutions in his county as conferred by statute.”

However, they also ruled that the State’s Attorney is the only official whom by statute can initiate and prosecute criminal charges in that county (Ill.Rev.Stat. 1973, ch. 14, § 5) and that the Illinois Constitution gives the Attorney General only the “duties and powers that may be prescribed by law.” They also ruled that the statutes prescribe the Attorney General’s duties to include to “attend…and assist in the prosecution.” (Ill.Rev.Stat.1973, ch. 14 § 4). Therefore, the Illinois Supreme Court concluded that:

As we have previously stated, the aforementioned duties and powers of the two officers are concurrent. Thus, the Attorney General lacks the power to take exclusive charge of the prosecution of those cases over which the State’s Attorney shares authority. (People v. Flynn (1941), 375 Ill. 366, 368, 31 N.E.2d 591.) However, where the statute so provides, the Attorney General has exclusive authority to institute and prosecute. See, e.g., Ill.Rev.Stat. 1977, ch. 120 par. 453.16 (Cigarette Tax Act prosecution); Ill.Rev.Stat. 1977, ch 38, par. 60-6 (Illinois Antitrust Act prosecution). [They explained that since Illinois Revenue Laws do NOT give the Illinois Attorney General exclusive authority to prosecute violation of revenue laws, the Illinois Attorney General may NOT prosecute these violations without the acquiescence of the State’s Attorney – in the revenue violation case in Buffalo Confectionery Co., the State’s Attorney was deemed to have acquiesced because he had been named to the grand jury, he had signed the indictments, he had attended the arraignments and he had filed certain pretrial discovery motions.)

They also found that an indictment is not invalidated because the Illinois Attorney General appears before the grand jury without approval of the State’s Attorney.

The court then stated that there was no statute prescribing the duties of the Attorney General to include prosecuting revenue claims to the exclusion of the State’s Attorney. (People v. Buffalo Confectionery, Co., Ibid at page 549 [4].) Analogously, in the above captioned case, there is no state statute that grants the Attorney General exclusive authority to prosecute cases of CRIMINAL vendor fraud. The statutes do however, proscribe the duties of the Attorney General to include exclusive prosecution of CIVIL vendor fraud. (305 ILCS 5/8A-7I.)

In Buffalo Confectionery, Co. (Ibid at page 548) the court noted that in that case the Assistant Attorney General (AAG) told the grand jury that he had obtained permission of a named Assistant State’s Attorney (ASA) to prosecute the case. The named ASA was present at the arraignment and filed a motion for pretrial discovery. The signature of the Cook County State’s Attorney appeared on the indictment. In the case at bar the AAG told the grand jury he had permission of the State’s Attorney, but does not name any such person. The ASA has not appeared at any hearing or before the grand jury in this case and has filed no motions. A signature stamp for SA Richard Divine on the indictment is the only documentation of involvement of the state’s attorney. This signature stamp does not verify that ANY person from the State’s Attorney’s office ever was consulted about this case, was shown evidence about this case, decided what charges should be filed, and consented to the prosecution of this case by the Attorney General with exclusion of ANY involvement of the State’s Attorney in this case.

In Buffalo Confectionery, Co. (Ibid at page 548 and 550) the court noted that there was an “obvious acquiescence by the State’s Attorney”, who was present at the arraignment and made a motion for pretrial discovery. In that case, it was clear that the State’s Attorney had considered the case and had decided to allow the AAG to proceed with prosecution without the ASA.

In, Shelton v. Brown, 126 S.Ct. 51, 163 L.Ed.2d 472, certiorari denied by the United States Supreme Court and the Illinois Supreme Court, the Illinois Appellate Court agreed with Cook County State’s Attorney Dick Devine stated in his Illinois Appellate Court response brief page 12,

“It is clear that in Illinois, even the Attorney General, a constitutionally created prosecuting office, cannot invade the exclusive jurisdiction of the State’s Attorney to bring charges absent some evidence of abuse by the state’s attorney, or a conflict of interest.

This issue in this case was whether or not citizens can file criminal complaints with the court clerk, without the approval or signature of police or the state’s attorney. The clerk had refused to accept criminal complaints by Shelton against corrupt State and County officials, including the State’s Attorney and police. The Appellate Court ruled that this refusal was proper and that citizens had no standing to file such complaints. The reasoning agreed with Cook County State’s Attorney Richard Divine who opined that the Attorney General has no statutory authority to indict and prosecute a person absent consent and participation of the State’s Attorney. This is binding precedent, so much so that any criminal prosecution of vendor fraud by the AG is null and void if the AG did not have the invitation, consent, and participation or acquiescence of the SA.

This position was later re-iterated in People v Dosaky, 303 Ill.App.3d 986, 709 N.E.2d 635 Ill.App. 1 Dist., 1999, where the court ruled:

"Attorney General lacks the power to take exclusive charge of the prosecution of those cases over which the State’s Attorney shares authority, but is authorized to consult with and advise the several State’s Attorneys and attend the trial of any party accused of a crime and assist in the prosecution."

Illinois statutes and case law are explicit in that an Attorney General, in Illinois, can only initiate and prosecute a criminal offense if they are invited to do so by the states attorney and the states attorney participates at hearings and at trial, if the State’s Attorney has reviewed the facts of the case, taken some initial steps towards prosecution and acquiesces to the Illinois Attorney General prosecuting without the State’s Attorney’s participation, or if statutory authority is granted, as it is in CIVIL prosecution of vendor fraud (after approval by OIG-DHHS), in certain environmental crimes or in certain cases involving drug crimes and other statutorily specified crimes.

Medicaid vendor fraud is not such a special statutory category subject to independent and exclusive prosecution by the Attorney General and cannot be criminally prosecuted by the Illinois Attorney General without the written approval of the OIG-DHHS and the request, and at least initial participation of the States Attorney, after the State’s Attorney has evaluated the evidence and determined which offense with which offender should be charged.

More recently, in People v. Knippenberg, 325 Ill.App.3d 251, 757 N.E.2d 667 Ill. App. 3 Dist., 2001, the Illinois Appellate Court ruled that the “Attorney General has exclusive authority to initiate and prosecute cases only when a statute so provides.”

The court in People v. Mitchell, 1971, 131 Ill.App.2d 347, 268 N.E.2d 232 states:

It is the responsibility of State’s attorney of county to appraise evidence against accused and determine offense with which he should be charged.

The court in People v Rhodes, 1967, 38 Ill.2d 389, 231 N.E.2d 400 states:

State’s attorney as a representative of the people has responsibility of evaluating evidence and other pertinent factors and determining what offense can properly and should properly be charged.

Therefore, without a specific statute giving the Illinois Attorney General authority to exclusively prosecute criminal Medicaid vendor fraud, the Illinois Attorney General may not prosecute anyone including Defendant in case at bar if there has been no review of evidence by the State’s Attorney, no determination of the charges by the State’s Attorney, no initial participation by the State’s Attorney, and no acquiescence by the State’s Attorney.

Without the authority of the Attorney General to prosecute the charges, the charges were not properly before the court and the case was void ab initio.

PROSECUTORS ACTING OUTSIDE THE SCOPE OF THEIR PROSECUTORIAL DUTIES DO NOT ENJOY ABSOLUTE IMMUNITY.

The Eight Circuit Court of Appeals in McGhee v. Pottawattamie Co., 547 F.3d 922 (2008) ruled that malicious and willful acts to fabricate probable cause are substantive due process violations and subject the prosecutor who fabricated probable cause to liability under § 1983. This is because the United States Supreme Court in Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478 (1991) took a functional approach as to the role of a prosecutor. If his acts were not intimately tied to the prosecution of the case, but were tied to the investigation, the prosecutor was not immune. This is consistent with Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 428, 430 (1971) where the court held that prosecutors are absolutely immune for acts intimately tied to the prosecution.

In this case prosecutorial absolute immunity does not attach to a prosecutor who never had statutory or constitutional authority to prosecute the alleged crime; does not attach to an Illinois Police investigator prior to the charging of the crime; does not attach to Illinois Medicaid Office of Inspector General nurses serving as investigators; does not attach to Defendant AAG Murray who served as an investigator gathering evidence and later joined the prosecution team; and does not attach to an Attorney General or her staff who willingly and intentionally ignore Illinois Code and Rules as well as Federal Medicaid Code in order to bring false charges to whistle blowers, who are witnesses to their corruption, as is Defendant and the persons the Illinois Attorney General have prosecuted for Medicaid Vendor fraud using virtually identical fraudulent indictments, using the same investigator and witnesses (Inv. Reibel and Lovett), and fraudulently presenting the same false information about the law to the multiple grand juries. These persons have included Dr. Maisha Hamilton Bennett, Vernon Glass, M.S., and Naomi Jennings R.N., as well as Plaintiff.

Therefore, the Illinois Attorney General, her staff, and her investigators are not immune from liability.

VOID FOR VAGUENESS DOCTRINE

It is impermissible to prosecute a person, per due process requirements, for a crime if it relies on a vague, ambiguous, or conflicting legal requirement. As the Seventh Circuit Court recently emphasized in Gresham v. Peterson, 225 F.3d 899 (7th Cir. 2000), criminal penalties require a “high degree of clarity.” Id. at 908. A year earlier, the Seventh Circuit Court also held:

The vagueness doctrine holds that a person cannot be held liable for conduct he could not reasonably have been expected to know was a violation of law. It is well-settled that, as a matter of due process, a criminal statute that fails to give a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice that his contemplated conduct is forbidden by the statute, or is so indefinite that it encourages arbitrary and erratic arrests and convictions is void for vagueness. [United States v. Brierton, 165 F.3d 1133, 1138-39 (7th Cir. 1999) (as amended)]

The Supreme Court has emphasized this same principle on numerous occasions. In United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612 (1954), the Court held that:

The constitutional requirements of definiteness is violated by a criminal statute that fails to give a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice that his contemplated conduct is forbidden by the statute. The underlying principle is that no man shall be held criminally responsible for conduct which he could not reasonable understand to be proscribed. [Id.at 617 (citations omitted)]

See also Dowling v. United States, 473 U.S. 207, 229 (1985) (reversing a conviction because “Congress has not spoken with the requisite clarity” and affirming the “‘time-honored interpretive guideline’ that ‘ambiguity concerning the ambit of criminal statutes should be resolved in favor of lenity’”) (quoting Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419, 427 (1985) and United States v. Hudson, 7 Cranch 32 (1812), inner quotations omitted.)

Even if the Illinois regulation per the Administrative Code is upheld to deny reimbursement for these counseling services to the poor, all defendants in any similar vendor fraud cases indictments and prosecutions cannot be sustained amid the uncertainty and vagueness created by the federal-state conflict. Indictment and prosecution of any defendant under a similar theory to this case of substitute billing run afoul of the Seventh Circuit Court’s holdings in Gresham and Brierton, and the Supreme Court precedents following Harriss.